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Diplomatic Remedies for THAAD Madness: The US, China and
the Two Koreas
Mel Gurtov
Abstract:  This  commentary  assesses  the
geopolitical implications for war and peace in
Northeast Asia of the Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense antimissile  system that the US
seeks to install in South Korea at a time of deep
tensions in Northeast Asia.
THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense,
Lockheed Martin, “We’re engineering a better
tomorrow”
The  US  decision,  supported  by  the  South
Korean government,  to  deploy  an antimissile
system  known  as  THAAD  (Terminal  High
Altitude Area Defense) may be one of the most
thoughtless  strategic  moves  in  a  generation.
The  official  US  justification  is  that  close-in
defense  against  North  Korean  missiles  is
necessary  to  protect  South  Korea.  But  the
deployment is having more than a few negative
repercussions:  an  argument  in  China  for
increasing  its  nuclear  weapons  stockpile;  an
incentive  in  North  Korea  for  continuing  to
develop  its  long-range  missile  capability;  a
deep fissure in China-South Korea relations; a
roiling of South Korean politics at a time when
its corrupt president has been impeached; and
a new source of tension in already fraught Sino-
US relations.
Most  of  these  negatives  could  have  been
anticipated when THAAD was initially on the
drawing board several years ago. Yet they were
thrust  into  the background on the argument
that  the  North  Korean  missile  threat  to  the
continental US was so pressing as to warrant
building a defense against it. Never mind that
Kim Jong-un and his colleagues would have to
contemplate  that  a  missile  attack  on  South
Korea, Japan, or the United States would result
in a counterattack and the immediate and utter
destruction  of  North  Korea’s  military  and
political institutions. But US leaders in the last
two  administrations  have  preferred  to  press
ahead  with  missile  defense  rather  than  (a)
consider  the  possibility  that  North  Korea’s
nuclear weapon and missile buildup is intended
to  deter  a  US  attack;  (b)  weigh  a  new
diplomatic  overture  to  the  North  that  might
reduce tensions and thus the need for THAAD;
and (c) give North Korea further incentive to
complete  work  on  an  ICBM.  Lay  the  US
decision at the door of the “military-industrial
complex” if  you will—Lockheed Martin is the
manufacturer, and a single THAAD unit costs
about  $1.6  billion1—the  fact  remains  that
planning  and  deployment  of  THAAD  is  a
decision where the risks and costs far outweigh
any benefit.
And  those  (supposed)  benefits  are  already
shrinking. North Korea now has a formidable
array of short- and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (IRBMs), and seems close to deploying
an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Its
latest test, in which four IRBMs were launched
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into the Sea of Japan, may be just the beginning
of a new round of missile testing as the North
evidently  seeks  the  ability  to  overwhelm
THAAD  and  pose  a  credible  threat  to
neighboring countries and in theory to the US
west  coast.  THAAD may be  an  improvement
over other antiballistic missile (ABM) systems,
and it has reportedly passed more tests than it
has  failed.  But  time  and  again  it  has  been
shown  that  ABMs  cannot  shoot  down  every
missile,  which  is  presumably  armed  with
decoys  and  penetration  aids.  And  THAAD,
according to one expert, is “useless” against an
ICBM.2  The  Japanese,  who  already  have  an
ABM system (PAC-3), can’t feel all that much
more secure because of THAAD.
Though Kim Jong-un and his  generals  surely
are not suicidal, the new and inexperienced US
ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley,
has just described Kim as “not rational.” Most
observers of North Korea over the years have
considered  its  strategic  thinking  every  bit
rational given its history of seven decades of
rule, much of it under attack and/or blockade
by the United States,  its coalition allies,  and
South Korea. The view of North Korean leaders
has always been that  their  security  is  under
threat and that nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles are their best means of defense from
threats—from deployment  of  THAAD to  wipe
out  the  North’s  missile  advantage,  from the
annual  large-scale  joint  US-South  Korean
exercise  known  as  Foal  Eagle  that  is  now
underway,  from  US  air  and  naval  power
arrayed throughout East Asia, and from nuclear
threats such as the “kinetic options” that Haley
referenced.  Pyongyang will  most  likely  forge
ahead with nuclear and missile development so
long as the United States offers no incentives
that  might  incline  Kim  Jong-un  to  choose  a
different route to security.
Meanwhile,  the  Chinese,  who  have  railed
against THAAD for years, now may make their
own  countermove.  Their  argument  is  that
THAAD  threatens  China’s  strategic  situation
because  of  its  radar  warning  system,  which
may reduce if not neutralize China’s ability to
respond  immediately  to  an  external  attack.
Beijing  has  never  been  persuaded  by  US
arguments  that  THAAD is  solely  directed  at
North  Korean  missiles.  Since  China  sees
THAAD as actually directed at it, Beijing may
well  respond  by  expanding  its  arsenal  of
nuclear-tipped  missiles.  Launch-on-warning
might  also  become  an  attractive  option  for
China, a course that would greatly increase the
risk of nuclear war.
Another  cost  of  THAAD  deployment  is  the
sudden  end  of  the  China-South  Korea
honeymoon. Until recently China was on a roll
with South Korea in everything from trade and
investment  to  tourism,  entertainment,  and
educational exchange.3 The two countries were
officially  described  as  having  a  “matured
strategic cooperative partnership,” reflected in
much more frequent high-level contact between
Beijing  and  Seoul  than  between  Beijing  and
Pyongyang. THAAD has placed South Korea on
China’s  enemy list:  South Korean goods and
entertainers  are  being  boycotted,  and  some
Chinese sources are calling for direct political
and even military action against South Korea.
This rupture bodes ill for Chinese cooperation
on  UN-authorized  sanctions  against  North
Korea  as  well  as  for  Chinese  aspirations  to
become as  important  to  South  Korea  as  the
Americans have traditionally been.4
Deployment of THAAD could not have come at
a worse time for South Korea. A constitutional
court has just ruled unanimously that President
Park Geun-hye must step down in the wake of
corruption charges. A new election will be held
within 60 days. By then THAAD may be fully
deployed as the US rushes to make the system
a  fait  accompli  for  the  next  South  Korean
president.  If  Moon Jae-in,  currently the front
runner  and  an  admirer  of  Kim  Dae-jung’s
Sunshine policy, is elected, he will face a very
difficult  decision—whether  to  insist  that
THAAD  not  be  made  operational  and  risk
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angering  Washington,  or  allow it  to  become
operational and anger China and North Korea.
A  Terminal  High  Altitude  Area  Defense
interceptor being fired during an exercise in
2013, U.S. Department of Defense
Finally,  THAAD  adds  to  the  mix  of  policy
differences  between  China  and  the  US.  The
Trump administration has thus far shown little
interest in, and knowledge of East Asian affairs.
The president has no legitimate Asia expertise
to rely on, and has already made some serious
missteps on China. The last thing Trump needs
as he deals with “Russiagate” and numerous
domestic  challenges  is  a  major  dispute  with
China and an ever-enlarging strategic problem
with North Korea. THAAD worsens his options.
Whether Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who
is about to visit South Korea and China, will
come to that conclusion is open to doubt. He
too has limited experience in Asia and so far
has been invisible in US policymaking.
China’s foreign minister Wang Yi has made an
interesting  proposal:  “double  suspension”  to
put a brake on the escalating situation. His idea
is that the US and ROK would suspend their
joint  exercises  in  return  for  North  Korea’s
suspension of nuclear and missile tests, and all
sides  would  return  to  the  negotiating  table.
“Are  both  sides  prepared  for  a  head-on
collision?” he asked.5 Evidently one of them is;
Nikki Haley, joined by her Korean counterpart,
dismissed Wang’s idea as not being at the right
time. Instead, “I can tell you we’re not ruling
out  anything,  and  we’re  considering  every
option,”  Haley  said.6  So  who  is  not  being
rational?
Constantly talking up the North Korean threat
and using it to justify ever more sophisticated
and  expensive  antimissile  technologies  to
defend against it is foolish and self-defeating.
Diplomacy  with  North  Korea  is  much  more
cost-effective.  If  Washington  were  in  more
experienced hands, it would indefinitely delay
full deployment of THAAD or, if requested by a
new  South  Korean  president,  decide  not  to
operationalize it. Secretary Tillerson might, as
a  result  of  discussions  with  ROK  leaders,
announce on his current trip that future US-
ROK exercises would depend on the security
situation on the peninsula—a half-step toward
Wang Yi’s proposal. 
These  moves  would  not  resolve  the  nuclear
issue  with  North  Korea  or  turn  around
contentious relations with China. But sidelining
THAAD would reassure China—it  might  even
provide  a  bargaining  chip  to  freeze  Chinese
weapons deployments in the South China Sea.
It would certainly remove a volatile issue from
South Korean politics at a time of a national
leadership crisis. If a new decision on THAAD
were  accompanied  by  revival  of  talks  with
N o r t h  K o r e a ,  w h i c h  a  M o o n  J a e - i n
administration in Seoul is likely to initiate and
which  the  Trump  administration  should
support,  it  might  put  a  brake  on  the  drift
toward  confrontation.  Unless  the  Trump
administration  starts  paying  attention  to
THAAD’s liabilities, it will face a cold-war style
crisis at the same time that the United States
and Europe are in the midst of another cold
war standoff with Russia over Ukraine.
The multiple security issues in Northeast Asia
are  precisely  why  a  regional  multilateral
security dialogue mechanism is essential, such
as  I’ve  suggested  in  these  pages.7  It  would
provide  a  venue  for  addressing  common-
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security issues such as climate change, public
health  and  economic  development  in  North
Korea, sustainable energy, and a peace treaty
ending  the  Korean  War  guaranteed  by  the
major powers. To be sure, nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles are worrisome not only for the
United States, the two Koreas, and China but
for  all  nations  in  the  region:  China  has  a
legitimate  concern  about  having  its  nuclear
deterrent  compromised  by  THAAD,  and  the
United States certainly wants strategic stability
with China. The United States has a legitimate
desire to defend against North Korean missiles
that  can  reach  Japanese  and  South  Korean
targets and one day soon the US west coast.
But  North  Korea  has  an  equally  legitimate
objective to strengthen its deterrent in the face
of  US,  Korean,  Japanese,  and  now  Chinese
pressures.  And  so  it  goes.  Arguing  about
“defensive” and “offensive” weapons is likely to
be a non-starter, however, unless some degree
of  mutual  trust  can be achieved first.  North
Korea’s  arsenal  of  perhaps  twenty  nuclear
weapons and its formidable missile capability
present  a  much  different  challenge  from  a
decade ago.
Previous regional diplomacy in Northeast Asia
has produced results worth building on. The Six
Party  Talks  in  2005  and  2007  created  a
reasonable  menu of  “action-for-action”  steps,
including  economic  and  energy  cooperation
and  normalization  of  diplomatic  relations  as
well  as  denuclearization  of  the  Korean
peninsula. A dialogue mechanism can breathe
new  life  into  those  talks,  affording  the
opportunity to debate rather than fire away and
consider small steps to defuse tensions. Absent
such  a  mechanism,  we  can  expect  that  the
North Koreans will proceed with nuclear and
missile development,  China’s appeals to both
North and South Korea will fall on deaf ears,
and the US-ROK-Japan alliance will plot ways to
pressure  North  Korea  even  more  intensely
rather  than  restart  a  dialogue  with  it.8  The
consequences can be explosive.
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